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ABSTRACT 
Windows OS kernel memory is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. By launching such attacks, hackers 
are succeeding in process privilege escalation and tampering with users’ data by accessing kernel-mode 
memory. This paper considers a new example of such an attack, which results in access to the files opened 
in an exclusive mode. Windows built-in security features prevent such legal access, but attackers can 
circumvent them by patching dynamically allocated objects. The research shows that the Windows 10, 
version 1809 x64 is vulnerable to this attack. The paper provides an example of using MemoryRanger, a 
hypervisor-based solution to prevent such attack by running kernel-mode drivers in isolated kernel memory 
enclaves.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Modern preemptive multitasking operating systems 
like Windows and UNIX-based systems have two 
modes of operation: user mode and kernel mode. 
These modes are supported by CPUs and make it 
possible to isolate code and memory data in these 
two modes. 
Apart from OS kernel and drivers, kernel-mode 
memory includes a lot of sensitive data structures, 
which can be used by attackers. CPUs do not 
provide any security features to prevent illegal 
access to that memory. As a result, intruders can 
gain read- and write- access to the kernel-mode 
memory by installing malware drivers or by 
exploiting driver vulnerabilities.  
To mitigate these threats Windows has issued 
several protection mechanisms: PatchGuard, Device 
Guard etc. but they protect only fixed memory 
regions. For example, PatchGuard detects the 
Microsoft drivers hijacking (Unknowncheats, 2019). 
These security features do not completely prevent 
access to the dynamically allocated data structures.  
For example, by exploiting Microsoft CVE-2018-
8120 (Rapid7, 2018-a) vulnerability an attacker 
“could run arbitrary code in kernel mode”. By using 
recently published vulnerabilities CVE-2018-8611 
(Rapid7, 2018-b) and CVE-2018-8170 (Rapid7, 
2018-c) attackers can elevate process privileges 
even on the newest Windows 10.  
Newest APT such as FruityArmor and SandCat 
applies zero-day vulnerabilities of Windows OS 
kernel components, such as Win32k.sys to elevate 
process privileges: CVE-2018-8453, CVE-2018-
8589, CVE-2019-0797. During these attacks, 
intruders patch the fields of EPROCESS structure, 
which corresponds to the particular process.  
This paper considers a new kernel-mode memory 
attack on FILE_OBJECT structures, which makes it 
possible to read and write the content of the files 
opened by drivers in an exclusive mode. As a result, 
attackers can illegally access opened local and 
network files, which were not permitted for sharing.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  
Section 2 provides the details of this attack and 
shows that security features from Windows 10 do 
not prevent it.  
Section 3 contains the details of adapting 
MemoryRanger to prevent this attack and 
demonstrates that this solution successfully prevents 
this attack.  
Section 4 and Section 5 focus on the main 
conclusions and further research directions 
respectively.   
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2.  HIJACKING FILE_OBJECT TO GET AN 
ACCESS TO THE FILE OPENED IN 
EXCLUSIVE MODE 
This section describes the internals of filesystem 
routines in the kernel mode with and without 
sharing access. The details of how to gain a full 
access to the file opened in an exclusive mode will 
be given in the second part of this chapter. 
2.1. Overview of File System Kernel-mode 
Routines 
Windows drivers call the following routines during 
file operations: 
• ZwCreateFile – to create (or open) a file; 
• ZwReadFile/ZwWriteFile – to read and 
write the file content; 
• ZwClose – to close the file handle and 
release system resources. 
The detailed overview of all the parameters for the 
functions are in MSDN (2017). All the steps for 
creating a file and getting the file handle are 
presented by Tanenbaum (2015). 
The first function ZwCreateFile takes the full file 
name, flags etc and returns a handle to a 
successfully opened file or otherwise it returns error 
status. During this operation, the I/O manager calls 
the Object Manager to look up the named file and to 
help it resolve any symbolic links to the file object 
(Easefilter, n.d.).  
Object Manager calls Security Reference Monitor 
(SRM) to process security checks, see Figure 1.  
According to Yosifovich, Ionescu, Russinovich, & 
Solomon (2017) SRM determines “whether a file’s 
Access Control List (ACL) allows to access the file 
in the way its thread is requesting. If it does, the 
object manager grants the access and associates the 
granted access rights with the file handle that it 
returns”. I/O Manager builds FILE_OBJECTS with 
the help from the Object Manager (Russinovich, 
1997; Nagar, 1997-a). The handle is used in read 
and write operations as well as to close the file. The 
FILE_OBJECT structure is an internal OS structure, 
which plays the role of kernel equivalent of a 
handle. As a result, each opened file has two 
structures in memory: a handle and a 
FILE_OBJECT, see Figure 1.  
The functions ZwReadFile\ ZwWriteFile take the 
handle obtained at the previous step to read and 
write the files content. According to the Fernandez 
E. B. and Sinibaldi J.C. (2003) during these 
operations, SRM is not involved, see Figure 1, and 
this vulnerability can be used by attackers.  
 
Figure 1 Internals of File System Routines in Windows Kernel 
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Finally, the ZwClose routine takes a handle to finish 
all writing operations and close an opened file. 
During this operation, SRM is not involved either. 
2.2. Windows built-in security sharing 
ZwCreateFile has a ShareAccess flag. This flag 
determines how the file is currently opened and also 
determines types of access allowed to proceed or 
deny with an error code of 
STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION (Nagar, 1997-
a).  
Let us focus on the following scenario, see Figure 2. 
Driver A calls ZwCreateFile without sharing 
permission or with flag ShareAccess equals NULL. 
Object Manager successfully allocates 
FILE_OBJECT. Next the attacker’s Driver calls the 
ZwCreateFile in order to gain a legal access to the 
file, which is already opened in an exclusive mode 
by DriverA. Object Manager returns the error status 
STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION to the 
attacker’s Driver, and prevents access to the file. As 
a result, the attacker fails to open such a file.  
The present research reveals a vulnerability in File 
System Routines. The thing is that Object Manager 
addresses SRM only during ZwCreateFile call. 
Object Manager does not process any security 
checks during ZwReadFile and ZwWriteFile calls.  
2.3. Analysis of FILE_OBJECT structure 
Let us have a look at the details of FILE_OBJECT 
structure. As it was mentioned before, this structure 
is created by I/O Manager when a driver opens a file 
handle.  
FILE_OBJECT structure includes about 30 fields, 
the detailed overview of all these files are presented 
by (McHoes, & Flynn, 2013) and (Nagar, 1997-b).  
FILE_OBJECT fields partially duplicates the flags, 
which have been used during calling ZwCreateFile. 
For example, for the file opened by ZwCreateFile 
routine with flag ShareAccess, which equals NULL, 
the corresponding FILE_OBJECT structure has zero 
fields SharedRead and SharedWrite. The processed 
research shows that setting SharedRead and 
SharedWrite fields in the FILE_OBJECT does not 
allow the shared access to this file. The information 
about files sharing permission is also collected by 
SRM in the ACLs.  
The following four FILE_OBJECT fields are used 
during read and write operations:  
• Vpb; 
• FsContext; 
• FsContext2; 
• SectionObjectPointer. 
The Vpb field is initialized by the I/O Manager 
before sending a create or an open request to the file 
system driver. The Vpb field points to a mounted 
Volume Parameter Block (VPB), associated with 
the target device object. 
 
 
Figure 2. Windows OS prevents an illegal access attempt via calling ZwCreateFile to the file opened 
without sharing permissions  
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According to Nagar (1997-a) the FsContext, 
FsContext2, and SectionObjectPointer fields are 
initialized and maintained by the file system drivers 
and the NT Cache Manager.  
FsContext points to the 
FSRTL_COMMON_FCB_HEADER structure, 
which has to be allocated by the file system or 
network driver.  
FsContext2 field refers to the Context Control Block 
(CBB) associated with the file object.  
SectionObjectPointer refers to a structure of type 
SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS and stores file-
mapping and caching-related information for a file 
stream.  
These four fields are used in read and write files 
operations, which are processed without involving 
SRM and checking shared permission.  
The key feature is that attackers can read these 
fields without any issues and use them to gain an 
access to the opened file. The details of this hijacked 
attack are below. 
2.4. Accessing the content of the file opened in an 
exclusive mode by hijacking its FILE_OBJECT 
Let us move on to the considered scenario, see 
Figure 3. In a similar way, DriverA has opened a 
target file in an exclusive mode. Object Manager 
successfully allocated the FILE_OBJECT structure 
to handle this file. 
As it was mentioned before, the legal access to this 
file is blocked and the malware driver processes the 
following steps to gain the access illegally: 
1. Calls ZwCreateFile routine to create a new 
file, e.g. with the name “hijacker.txt”. 
2. Calls ObReferenceObjectByHandle to get a 
pointer to the created FILE_OBJECT for 
the file hijacker.txt. 
3. Finds FILE_OBJECT structure for the 
target file using the file name and walk 
through the Object Directory list 
(Probert, 2004; Pistelli, n.d.; Silberman, 
2006; Microsoft. n.d.; GamingMasteR, 
2009; Korkin & Nesterow, 2016; Fyyre, 
2018; Abdalhalim, 2018).  
4. Copies the following four fields from 
FILE_OBJECT for the target_file to the 
FILE_OBJECT for the file hijacker.txt:  
• Vpb;  
• FsContext; 
• FsContext2; 
• SectionObjectPointer. 
5. Calls ZwReadFile/ZwWriteFile with the 
opened handle for the hijack_file to read 
and write the content of the target_file. 
After processing these five steps, malware driver 
has achieved a full read and write access to the 
target file.  
These manipulations were successfully tested on 
Windows 10, version 1809 x64. After waiting 10 
hours, nothing happened, like appearing BSOD 
from PatchGuard, which is designed to prevent 
illegal memory modifications. 
The experimental results show that a malware driver 
can gain full access to the opened file without 
sharing permission by hijacking its FILE_OBJECT 
and PatchGuard does not prevent this invasion.  
The presented kernel attack is applicable to all 
modern Windows OSes since Windows NT 4.0. 
Windows components Object Manager  and 
Security Reference Monitor involved in that attack, 
were first mentioned by Feldman (1993). And the 
first memory protection concept was developed in 
Multics system GE mainframe in 1965 by Corbató 
& Vyssotsky (1965). 
To protect files content from being stolen and 
guarantee trusted computing the MemoryRanger 
hypervisor could be applied. The steps of adapting 
MemoryRanger to prevent this attack are in the next 
section.  
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Figure 3. The attacker’s driver hijacks the target FILE_OBJECT structure to gain an illegal access to the 
file opened without sharing permission 
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3. MEMORYRANGER PREVENTS 
FILE_OBJECT HIJACKING VIA MEMORY 
ISOLATION 
MemoryRanger is an open-source solution 
designed to protect kernel-mode memory by 
creating isolated kernel enclaves and running 
drivers inside them (Korkin, 2018-a). 
MemoryRanger has flexible architecture, which 
makes it possible to extend it for the protection of 
new memory regions without any issues.  
This chapter includes brief overview of main 
components of MemoryRanger and steps for 
adapting them to prevent FILE_OBJECT hijacking 
attack. 
3.1. MemoryRanger architecture 
MemoryRanger is a hypervisor-based solution and 
includes the following components, see Figure 4: 
• A kernel-mode driver; 
• DdiMon; 
• MemoryMonRWX; 
• Memory Access Policy (MAP). 
The kernel-mode driver registers driver-supplied 
callback routines that are subsequently notified 
about various OS events, for example, about 
loading a new driver.  
The next two components DdiMon and 
MemoryMonRWX leverage hypervisor facilities 
and use VT-x technology with Extended Page 
Tables (EPT) mechanism, provided by Intel CPU. 
DdiMon is designed to monitor device driver 
interfaces and is able to hook kernel-mode API 
calls transparently for the OS.  
MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap all 
types of memory access: read, write, and execute. 
Memory Access Policy (MAP) plays a role of an 
intermediary during memory access to the protected 
data and decides whether to block or allow access. 
Initially MemoryRanger allocates the default EPT 
structure and puts all loaded drivers and kernel 
inside it. MemoryRanger traps loading of a new 
driver, then MemoryRanger allocates and 
configures a new EPT structure so that only this 
new driver and OS kernel are executed here. 
MemoryRanger isolates execution of drivers by 
switching between EPTs.  
MemoryRanger hooks kernel API calls. The current 
version of MemoryRanger hooks 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag function to the protected 
newly allocated memory. Each time an isolated 
driver allocates memory, MemoryRanger updates 
all EPTs: the allocated memory buffer is accessible 
only for this driver, while all other EPTs exclude 
this memory. MemoryRanger skips the legal 
memory access attempts and prevents the illegal 
ones. 
 
Figure 4. MemoryRanger architecture  
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3.2. Adapting MemoryRanger to protect 
FILE_OBJECT structures 
To add a FILE_OBJECT support in 
MemoryRanger the modification of following 
components have been involved: 
• DdiMon; 
• MAP component. 
The updated DdiMon hooks two file system-related 
routines ZwCreateFile() and ZwClose().  
ZwCreateFile-callback routine processes the 
following: 
1. Calls the original ZwCreateFile routine and 
checks whether the returned status is 
successful. 
2. Checks whether the file has been created 
without sharing permission.  
3. Checks whether the return address belongs 
to the protected drivers. 
4. Gets the pointer to the allocated 
FILE_OBJECT by calling 
ObReferenceObjectByHandle. 
5. Adds the FILE_OBJECT pointer and its 
size, which equals 0xB bytes to the 
protected memory region.  
ZwClose()-callback routine processes the 
following: 
1. Checks whether the return address belongs 
to the protected drivers. 
2. Gets the pointer to the allocated 
FILE_OBJECT by calling 
ObReferenceObjectByHandle. 
3. Deletes the FILE_OBJECT pointer and its 
size, which equals 0xB-bytes from the list 
of the protected memory region.  
The MAP component algorithm processes access 
violation due to access to FILE_OBJECT structure 
in a similar way to the existing algorithm for 
processing access to the allocated memory pools.  
The experimental results demonstrate that updated 
MemoryRanger has successfully protected 
FILE_OBJECT structures by preventing its 
hijacking without blocking legal access to 
FILE_OBJECT, see Figure 5. The source code of 
updated MemoryRanger and video demonstrations 
are here (Korkin, 2018-b).  
The processing experiments on Windows 10 x64 
have shown that developed updated 
MemoryRanger causes acceptable performance 
degradation.  
 
Figure 5. MemoryRanger prevents FILE_OBJECT hijacking by  
running drives into isolated kernel-mode memory enclaves  
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
In summary:  
1. Recently published kernel-mode exploits 
highlight the fact that dynamically 
allocated data structures in Windows OS 
kernel are becoming vulnerable.  
2. The analyzed attack on FILE_OBJECT 
shows that the content of exclusively 
opened file can be tampered with.  
3. The proposed update for MemoryRanger 
shows how to prevent hijacking attacks on 
FILE_OBJECT structures in kernel-mode 
memory.  
5.  FUTURE PLANS 
5.1. Prevent Process Privilege Escalation 
The analysis of recent kernel-mode vulnerabilities, 
such as CVE-2018-8120 (Rapid7, 2018-a), CVE-
2018-8611 (Rapid7, 2018-b) and CVE-2018-8170 
(Rapid7, 2018-c) shows that typically, vulnerable 
drivers do not access EPROCESS structures, but 
after exploitation, they tamper with process 
structures. For example during CVE-2018-8120 
exploitation Win32k.sys driver directly accesses 
EPROCESS fields, but usually this driver does not 
communicate with this structure.  
The current version of MemoryRanger traps the 
loading only of new drivers, moves only those to 
isolated enclosures. MemoryRanger skips already 
loaded drivers. 
MemoryRanger is able to prevent this attack by 
deliberately running all loaded drivers in separate 
enclaves.  
5.2. Protect ACL\DCL From Being Patched 
Information about objects access rights is collected 
in the Access Control List (ACL). During 
ZwCreateFile routine call, the ObjectManager asks 
about required permission from Security Reference 
Monitor, which walks through the ACL to check 
the permissions. ACL includes access control 
entries (ACEs), which indicate what rights are 
granted to the object (Hewardt & Pravat, 2008; 
Swift, Brundrett, Dyke, Garg, Hopkins, Chan, 
Goertzel, & Jensenworth, 2002; Bosworth & 
Kabay, 2002; Datta, 2012; The NT Insider, 2006; 
The NT Insider 1999; Govindavajhala & Appel, 
2006; MSDN, 2018; Russinovich, Ionescu & 
Solomon, 2012). 
It seems promising to analyze the possibility of 
attacks on the ACL in order to deliberately change 
access mask and gain access to the target object.  
MemoryRanger could be applied to provide the 
integrity of ACL and prevent these attacks in 
general.  
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